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ABSTRACT: Elements of  the Communist concept of  command 
continue to ramify throughout Central and Eastern European 
armed forces. They inhibit the orderly delegation of  command, 
the consistent creation of  defense capabilities, and the professional 
development of  commanders and managers; they also impede these 
armed services from adopting the concepts of  authority, account-
ability, and responsibility—concepts taken for granted in Western 
defense institutions.
An optimistic view of  military leadership in the defense insti-tutions of  Central and Eastern European post-Communist countries prevails among Western offi cials and infl uences many 
of  their decisions to support new allies in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Since most of  these European countries have 
deployed forces in combat and peace-support operations with NATO 
after the Cold War, and many have received positive reviews, these 
assumptions are understandable.1 Many Western leaders also presume 
commanders of  post-Communist nations who have been exposed to 
Western philosophies of  command during combined operations and 
the introduction of  modern Western combat platforms and systems 
will naturally adopt similar practices of  accountability and responsibility 
in their own organizations. This article examines the contrast of  such 
contemporary expectations in the context of  a trinity of  Communist 
legacy command concepts: collective decision-making to avoid personal 
responsibility; confl ating leadership, command, and management; and 
hypercentralized decision-making.2
Leaders in Central and Eastern Europe have yet to appreciate the 
effects of this trinity on the adoption of delegated decision-making on 
the development of a merit-based offi cer and noncommissioned offi cer 
corps and on the sustentation of Central and Eastern European military 
capabilities when they assess the viability of their armed forces under 
the shadow of Russia’s new adventurism. Interest also piques when dis-
cerning the challenges that have occurred during recent modernization 
The views expressed in this article are solely those of  the author and do not refl ect the policy or 
views of  the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of  the Navy, or the Department of  Defense. 
The writer would like to express his sincere gratitude to Glen Grant, Vladimir Milenski, and Bence 
Nemeth for their superb comments on earlier versions of  this manuscript
1      James S. Corum, Development of  the Baltic Armed Forces in Light of  Multinational Deployments 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2013), 34–38.
2      See Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of  Post-Communist European Defense Institutions: The Mirage of  
Military Modernity (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017); Thomas-Durell Young, “The Challenge 
of  Reforming European Communist Legacy ‘Logistics’,” Journal of  Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 3 
(2016): 352–70, doi:10.1080/13518046.2016.1200376; and Thomas-Durell Young, “Impediments 
to Reform in European Post-Communist Defense Institutions: Addressing the Conceptual Divide,” 
Problems of  Post-Communism (2016): 1–14, doi:10.1080/10758216.2016.1220256.
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efforts. With some exceptions such as Yugoslavia’s republic-based terri-
torial defense forces, post-Communist defense organizations come from 
a conceptual legacy whereby all decision-making was highly centralized 
and quite different from Western mission command philosophies.3 
Thus, integrating Western weapons systems and platforms, designed to 
require critical thinking and decentralized operation, is formidable. The 
Polish Air Force provides an apt example: they acquired F-16s in 2006, 
declared them operational in 2012, deployed them on operations for the 
fi rst time during the summer of 2016, and scheduled their fi rst Baltic Air 
Policing mission for May 2017.4
The omission of similar Central and Eastern European defense insti-
tutions’ preparedness to absorb more Western equipment, training, and 
exercises, let alone effectively use such resources, is not fully appreciated 
by Western leaders. In March 2016, for instance, US Air Force General 
Philip M. Breedlove, who was then commander of the US European 
Command, presented a comprehensive review of the state of security 
and defense in Europe to the US Senate Armed Services Committee.5 
Yet, his testimony in no way suggested a need to address the conceptual 
and philosophical foundations of these defense institutions. Thus, one 
can only conclude US planning and managing of military and defense 
advice and assistance to these critical allies is premised on the unchal-
lenged, and indeed dubious, assumption that these organizations hold 
Western philosophies of command and governance.
The anatomy of post-Communist defense institutions in the context 
of organizational sociology, however, reveals strong political, institu-
tional, cultural, and indeed, sociological infl uences that inhibit the 
adoption of basic Western concepts of defense governance. These legacy 
practices produce organizational pathologies which prevent delegating 
command authority in a planned and predictable fashion, producing 
defense capabilities, and developing commanders and managers at 
all levels. Although, these challenges cannot be solved using Western 
technical and educational programs alone, ignoring these command 
pathologies perpetuates Central and Eastern European military weak-
nesses and makes them vulnerable to opportunistic Russian mischief.
3      For more on mission command, see Headquarters, US Department of  the Army (HQDA), 
Commander and Staff  Organization and Operations, Field Manual (FM) 6-0 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 
2015).
4      Lukáš Dyčka and Miroslav Mareš, “The Development and Future of  Fighter Planes 
Acquisitions in Countries of  the Visegrad Group,” Journal of  Slavic Military Studies 25, no. 4 
(2012): 544–46, 555, doi:10.1080/13518046.2012.730370; Remigiusz Wilk, “Polish F-16s 
Deploy for First-Ever Combat Operation,” IHS Jane’s 360, July 7, 2016, http://www.janes.com
/article/62046/polish-f-16s-deploy-for-fi rst-ever-combat-operation; and Jacek Siminski, “Polish 
F-16s Prepare To Take Part in NATO Baltic Air Patrol Mission for the Very First Time,” Aviationist, 
February 23, 2017, https://theaviationist.com/2017/02/23/polish-f-16s-prepare-to-take-part-in
-nato-baltic-air-patrol-mission-for-the-very-fi rst-time/.
5      Hearing to Receive Testimony on Department of  Defense Security Cooperation and Assistance Programs 
and Authorities, Before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 114th 
Congress (March 9, 2016) (statement of  General Philip M. Breedlove, commander US Forces 
Europe); and Examining DOD Security Cooperation: When It Works and When It Doesn’t Before the US 
House of  Representatives Committee on Armed Services,” 114th Congress (October 21, 2015).
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Table 1. Understanding Western and Communist Legacy Command Concepts6
Mission Command Versus Detailed Command
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Higher tempo
Tends to lead to Centralization
Formality














Organization types fostered Hierarchic
Bureaucratic
Delegate Leadership styles Disempower and Direct
Art of war Appropriate to Science of war
Collective Decision-Making
Communist governance separated decision-making from account-
ability via collectivization. Various ministries actualized this managerial 
practice by forming collegia. These groups were perfect ideological 
expressions of collectivization as they removed an individual from any 
responsibility for the collegium’s decisions. In addition to removing the 
principle of individual accountability from governance and management, 
these bodies facilitated anonymous, arbitrary meddling at the expert 
level. In contrast, Western organizations encourage staffs to consult, 
coordinate, and recommend, while only senior offi cials, or commanders, 
make decisions.
Despite their dubious political provenance, collegia such as Ukraine’s 
military collegium and Moldova’s military council persist throughout 
former Soviet republics.7 Rarer in former Warsaw Pact defense institu-
tions, such governing organizations existed until recently in Slovakia 
and Hungary, and arguably still exist in Bulgaria.8 These bodies still 
6      I am indebted to Major General Walter Holmes, Canadian Army (Ret), for permission to use 
the chart he developed, which also appears in Young, “Impediments to Reform.”
7      Ben Lombardi, “Ukrainian Armed Forces: Defence Expenditure and Military Reform,” Journal 
of  Slavic Military Studies 14, no. 3 (2001): 32, doi:10.1080/13518040108430487.
8      A Slovakian think tank advocated for regular consultations between the president and the chief  
of  defense, as well as the minister of  defense’s collegium to enable more informed decision-making. 
See Jaroslav Naď, Marian Majer and Milan Šuplata, 75 Solutions for Slovakia’s Defence (Bratislava: 
Central European Policy Institute, 2015), 2; and Réka Szemerkényi, Central European Civil-Military 
Reforms at Risk, Adelphi Paper 306 (Oxford: Oxford University Press / International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1996), 13, 15. The Collegium of  the Minister began during the Communist period. 
As the membership of  that body and the current defense council remain essentially the same, argu-
ably, its purpose to depersonalize decision-making and escape from responsibility has not changed.
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function extensively, sometimes under disguise or mutation as in the 
former Yugoslav Republics.9
In Serbia, for instance, matériel requirement proposals are reviewed 
by the minster of defense’s collegium. In the case of Macedonia, its col-
legium comprises the chief of the general staff, his deputy, the director 
of the staff, and the heads of staff directorates and can include represen-
tatives from units and, at one point, even the resident NATO training 
team. Moreover, many of these countries practice joint meetings of the 
collegia of the ministry of defense and general staff or, alternately, the 
chief of defense or chief of the general staff attends the minister of 
defense’s collegium either regularly or by invitation.
Although not secretive, these bodies obscure senior-level decision-
making and thereby violate basic Western governance concepts such as 
the alignment of authority with accountability. Despite their prevalence, 
printed details regarding the constitution of these bodies is diffi cult 
to fi nd, which could explain why some collegia, such as Montenegro’s 
do not formally exist by law. Yet, one can gain an appreciation of the 
scope of these bodies’ responsibilities in the case of the General Staff 
collegium of the Vojska Srbije i Crne Gore (Armed Forces of Serbia 
and Montenegro), circa 2002, which were based on the practice of the 
Yugoslav People’s Army:
 • Analyze the outcome of the general staff’s monthly work plan.
 • Analyze combat readiness and determine causation of shortcomings.
 • Assess the regional intelligence and security situation and determine 
implications for the country.
 • Assess the regional security situation of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and analyze its possible implications for the combat readi-
ness of the armed forces and the defense of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia.
 • Analyze the fi nancial situation in the armed forces.
 • Determine whether there is a need for organizational changes within 
the armed forces.
 • Manage personnel issues:
 Regulate the condition in the service, promotions, termination of 
service, and retention in the service for professional soldiers of 
the general’s rank.
 Review and approve the colonel’s promotion list.
 Select candidates for professional military education courses.
 Assign postings of offi cers completing professional military 
education.
 Assign postings of colonels and lieutenant colonels.
 Manage regular promotion in the rank of colonel and all extraor-
dinary promotions for all professional solders.
9      While the title collegium is eschewed, Slovenia continues using boards or committees, some 
of  which are related to the collegia functions in all but name.
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 Oversee the condition of the service for colonels who are assigned 
to mobilization units.
 Determine who should be retained in service as distinguished 
experts who meet the requirements for retirement.
 Approve release from service.
 Analyze the personnel management of the armed forces.
 • Propose other issues for the attention of the chief of the general staff 
at his request.10
Based upon interviews with offi cials from numerous defense insti-
tutions throughout the region, these terms of reference clearly represent 
the responsibilities of their own collegium, or defense councils. When 
examining the strengths and weaknesses of these bodies, an inevitable 
explanation for their continued utilization is that they provide useful 
coordination in the absence of the chief of staff concept yet to be fully 
embraced throughout the region. Another argument is the group’s ability 
to obviate subjectivity, which is important to decision-making such as 
assignments and promotions.
What should surprise and disturb Western observers is the power 
collegia continue to hold over essentially all aspects of planning and 
managing Central and Eastern European armed forces. Notably, 
decision-making is limited to colonels and general offi cers; the views of 
others, no matter how well-informed, are not considered. Also vexing is 
the continued domination of these ranks in human resource management 
decisions, which violates Western defense governance principles. Coming 
from a tradition of conscription and an oversized offi cer corps based on 
mobilization, those transitioning and newly formed defense institutions 
lack centralized or integrated human resource structures. Except for 
the Yugoslav People’s Army, these services also lack noncommissioned 
offi cers with leadership responsibilities.11 Unsurprisingly, these factors 
contribute to the legacy practice of using collegia for personnel decision-
making that extends from individual units up to the general staffs and 
the ministries of defense.
Fundamentally, this form of collective decision-making undermines 
commanders’ authority to provide professional advice on individuals’ 
performance and prospects for growth and promotion—inherent 
responsibilities of commanders in Western armed forces. In the West, 
commanders’ recommendations weigh heavily in independent selec-
tion board processes to mitigate against favoritism, let alone nepotism. 
Moreover, as Central and Eastern European defense institutions con-
tinue to struggle to adopt Western concepts of defense governance, 
collegia have not been identifi ed for elimination. By continuing the 
practice of collective decision-making, they release senior offi cials from 
accountability and responsibility for their decisions.
One should never underestimate the strength of bureaucratic 
inertia, and clearly collegia are unlikely to be retired without considerable 
10      General Staff  of  the Armed Forces of  Yugoslavia, Order on Authorities of  the Organizational 
Units of  the General Staff  of  the Armed Forces of  Yugoslavia (Belgrade: Sector for Manning, Mobilization 
and Systems Issues, March 20, 2002), section IV (nota bene, translated text).
11      Robert Niebuhr, “Death of  the Yugoslav People’s Army and the Wars of  Succession,” 
Polemos 7, no. 13/14 (January 2004): 93.
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political pressure. Perhaps a fi rst step would be to assess the function 
of, and justifi cation for, collegia—for example, Macedonia adopted the 
chief of staff principle, which should enable objective evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the director of staff function thereby removing a justifi -
cation for the continued use of its collegia.
A fi nal concern with collegium is most Western offi cials and ana-
lysts are unaware of their existence, which leads to misunderstandings of 
the decision-making process, particularly regarding key human resource 
management functions. As the underlying organization’s sociology of 
decision-making remains misunderstood, Western offi cials have mis-
diagnosed the human resource management challenges faced by these 
organizations. By superfi cially defi ning weak personnel structures and 
processes as the challenges, Western offi cials and analysts have missed 
the key organizational sociology cause. The reason human resource 
management directorates appear to be underperforming by Western 
expectations is due to these relatively new bureaucratic bodies existing 
in a parallel bureaucratic universe where power continues to be exercised 
by collegia.
Accordingly, human resource management directorates concern 
themselves with administration and the exercise of negative control with 
hardly any consistent, constructive infl uence on personnel decisions. 
Thus, when reforming this key aspect of management, offi cials need to 
identify collegia as a reality that can only be addressed within the political 
context of democratic defense governance. In other words, a bottom-up, 
technical approach without strong, supportive messaging from national 
leaders will always be stillborn. Within the legacy of detailed command 
structures, a directive approach is likely to be much more effective than 
using Western national models and modeling delegation.
Even more pressing, Western and allied offi cials must acknowledge 
the deleterious effect collegia have on developing commanders. The 
importance of basing performance assessments on the objective assess-
ments by fi eld commanders should be incorporated in efforts to develop 
leadership, command, management, and decision-making capabilities of 
partner nations. These efforts should encourage serving in units as a 
necessary step toward overcoming the current professional strategy of 
seeking permanent postings on staffs, where decisions are made and 
power over personnel management decisions is highly concentrated. 
These current incentives are so misaligned that in some countries, such 
as Hungary, offi cers serving on the general staff are better paid than 
those commanding units.12 This perverse incentive discourages offi cers 
from serving in units, ensuring an institutional disconnect among the 
general staff, units, and commanders.
Confl ating Command and Management
Defense institutions which continue the legacy practice of collective 
decision-making suffer from another institutional lacuna within the 
context of the Western concept of defense governance. Whereas all of 
the Baltic States’ divided leadership and command from management—
the ministries of defense adopted posts for permanent under-secretaries 
12      Act CCV of  2012 on the Status of  Military Personnel, Hungarian Civil Code, 5th Appendix,
http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A1200205.TV (accessed October 27, 2016).
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and the armed forces have directors of staff—this practice is rare, even 
in Western-leaning Georgia.13
By confl ating leadership and command with management, it is 
essentially impossible for a policy framework that drives defense insti-
tutions to develop. Rather, power is concentrated in a small body of 
offi cials, thereby precluding critical thinking, effective coordination, 
and consensus-building. Due to centralized decision-making without a 
designated offi cial whose sole function is to optimize daily functioning 
of civilian or military organizations, these organizations are also all but 
incapable of performing effective staff work when judged by Western 
standards. As James Sherr of Chatham House so presciently observes:
As in other post-communist states, few and far between are those who 
ask themselves how policies, programmes and directives should be imple-
mented. The vastly safer and almost universal practice is to await orders 
about how orders should be implemented. If  directives are not to become 
conversation pieces, their authors must walk them through the system them-
selves. Not surprisingly, the result is a system overmanned, overworked and 
largely inert.14
As a result, there is no consistent management to ensure staff 
coordination, press decision-making downwards, and allow only the 
most critical policy issues to be addressed at the minister or the chief 
of defense level. By allowing, and indeed encouraging, all decision-
making to remain with the minister, the chief of defense, and within 
their collegia, no decision is too minor to be raised to them and modern 
command and management concepts cannot take hold.
Even the widespread practice of designating deputy ministers and 
deputy chiefs of defense to run the organization still breaks this prin-
ciple. These individuals cannot be honest brokers in the staffi ng process 
while being members of the leadership team. On the military side of 
the equation, even the seemingly advanced and reformed Polish defense 
institution has yet to embrace this concept: two deputies support the 
Polish chief of defense, but there is no chief of staff. This inability to 
divide command from management in Poland is remarkable considering 
it was a key reform principle identifi ed as early as 1992.15 Confusing 
hybrid models, such as the Czech armed forces who have both a fi rst 
deputy chief of defense as well as a deputy chief of defense and chief of 
staff, also exist.
Confl ating these two responsibilities produces yet another practice 
whereby commanders and staff offi cers are not allowed to develop 
properly. While the concentration of power may suggest an illusion of 
control, in reality, the system incentivizes offi cers to become microman-
agers. Offi cers are taught by examples of senior offi cers to focus inward 
13      Regarding the Lithuanian Ministry of  Defense see, Vaidotas Urbelis and Tomas Urbonas, 
“The Challenges of  Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of  Armed Forces: The Case 
of  Lithuania,” in Democratic Control of  the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards, eds. 
Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster (London: Palgrave, 2002), 117–18. For 
more on Georgia’s structure of  the ministry of  defence and joint staff, see Ministry of  Defence 
of  Georgia, Georgia, Strategic Defence Review, 2013–2016 (Tbilisi: Ministry of  Defence, 2013), 22, 23.
14      James Sherr, “Civil-Democratic Control of  Ukraine’s Armed Forces: To What End? By What 
Means?,” in Army and State in Postcommunist Europe, eds. David Betz and John Löwenhardt (London: 
Frank Cass, 2001), 74.
15      Andrew A. Michta, The Soldier-Citizen: The Politics of  the Polish Army after Communism (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 50–53.
38        Parameters 47(1) Spring 2017
on the organization as opposed to looking outward and thinking criti-
cally and creatively.16 These expectations cripple strategic-level thinking, 
thereby inhibiting thoughts of creating a future for the organization and 
dooming the armed services to live always in the past.17
Centralizing Financial Decision-Making
When the Cold War ended, every former post-Communist country 
found itself in a state of economic crisis. Strong pressure to decrease 
defense spending was accompanied by an outbreak of confl icts in 
Yugoslavia, the Caucasus, and Bessarabia, which further stressed 
defense budgets. None of these defense institutions, with the excep-
tion of the Yugoslav Territorial Defense Force, found themselves with 
a heritage of a modern defense planning nor a fi nancial management 
system that would enable them to conduct even the most rudimentary 
defense planning.18
With a universal focus on effecting civilian control and shrinking 
bloated Communist-era defense budgets, the fastest way to seize civilian 
control of the armed forces was by removing budget responsibilities from 
general staffs. Newly elected political leaders and civilian defense offi cials 
centralized all fi nancial decision-making within ministries of defense. In 
the case of the Yugoslav armed forces, whose commanders possessed 
their own budgets and spending authorities, the subsequent centraliza-
tion of fi nances constituted a major step backwards. Conversely, the 
Czech defense budget circa 1993 was almost incomprehensible to civilian 
government offi cials who were challenged to ascertain actual spending. 
In 1996, then-Czech Minister of Defense Vilem Holan launched a major 
reform that included the introduction of the “revolutionary” concept of 
double-entry bookkeeping management.19
Thus, the immediate task confronting early democratic reformers 
was to fi nd effective fi nancial management methods to stop defense 
institutions from spending public funds needed elsewhere. What began 
in the early years of democracy to make defense “fi t” its budget has 
become an all but impossible task. Notwithstanding reductions in force 
structure and personnel, retaining needless infrastructure continues to 
waste money. To appreciate the enormity of this task, upon indepen-
dence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 2006, Montenegro 
took possession of 12,000 tons of munitions and 242 pieces of real estate 
and 1,450 buildings it still owned in 2013.20
Established with Western technical assistance, planning, program-
ming, and budgeting system directorates placed unrelenting pressure on 
centralizing fi nancial decision-making that has only increased following 
16      Agnieszka Gogolewska, “Problems Confronting Civilian Democratic Control in Poland,” in 
Civil-Military Relations in Europe: Learning from Crisis and Institutional Change, eds. Hans Born, Marina 
Caparini, Karl W. Haltiner, and Jürgen Kuhlmann (New York: Routledge, 2006), 101.
17      The author is indebted to retired Colonel Vladimir Milenski, Bulgarian Army, for suggesting 
this most insightful observation.
18      See Glenn E. Curtis, ed., Yugoslavia: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research 
Division, Library of  Congress, 1992), 252; and Milojica Pantelic, “The System and Organization of  
National Defense,” Yugoslav Survey 10, no. 2 (1969): 6.
19      Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military 
Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefi eld, 2004), 35.
20      Montenegro Ministry of  Defence, Strategic Defence Review 2013 (Podgorica: Ministry of  
Defence, 2013), 19.
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the 2008 crisis—for example, Slovenia’s defense budget was savaged by 
a 34.6 percent reduction from 2007 to 2015.21 Historically, these direc-
torates have effectively maintained their own bureaucratic autonomy, 
though they have been particularly ineffective at translating any existing 
defense policy priorities and plans into measurable defense outcomes.22 
This hypercentralized fi nancial decision-making has produced practices 
in which the general staffs of such nations as Poland, Slovenia, Ukraine, 
and Serbia conduct force planning absent fi nancial inputs.
It is not surprising that few of these defense institutions have been 
capable of producing or executing viable defense plans. Thus, a unique 
managerial pathology has emerged throughout the region: ministries of 
defense not only manage all aspects of fi nances but also do so without 
considering whether outcomes are achievable. Instead, salaries, pen-
sions, military hospitals, and social welfare benefi ts—such as spas and 
even a ski resort in Bulgaria—have become default priorities that have 
produced under-staffed units, limited fl ying hours, and reduced ship 
days at sea.
Undermining Commanders
The confl uence of the Communist trinity of legacy concepts inhibits 
armed forces from developing leaders and fostering an environment 
for encouraging well-rounded, professional commanders to emerge. 
Even in reformed defense institutions, such as in Slovenia, the chief of 
defense controls no more than fi ve percent of the force’s budget and 
the midterm defense program restricts battalion commanders’ abilities 
to manage fi nances to meet assigned missions and tasks.23 Thus, junior 
leaders are not expected nor groomed to understand the relationship 
between fi scal management and force outcomes necessary for mid- and 
senior-grade postings.
Ministries of defense even determine personnel numbers and present 
them to chiefs of services as de facto decisions as well as regularly pro-
hibit these senior leaders from moving money from one category to 
another to produce outcomes. Even worse, commanders who should 
have the best appreciation of which leaders have both performed well 
in stressful command postings and have the potential for succeeding in 
more challenging command environments are not permitted to infl u-
ence personnel management decisions comparable to Western practices.
Such decision-making, again, is highly centralized in general staffs 
and ministries of defense. Arguably, the authority of the chief of defense 
in Slovenia is diluted since his list of offi cer promotion recommenda-
tions is fi rst vetted by the Intelligence and Security Service before being 
forwarded to the human resource management directorate, a practice 
one Slovenian general associates with control mechanisms and an 
ignorance of military advice. Legislation even enables untrained and 
21      Slovenia Ministry of  Defense, NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2015/16, ANNEX 1. 
AC/281-WP(2016)0024 (R), (Ljubljana: Ministry of  Defense, n.d.), 1–4. For more on US assistance 
programs in the area, see US Department of  Defense, FY 2010 Annual Report on Cost Assessment 
Activities (Washington, DC: DoD, 2011), 20, appendix 2.
22      Thomas-Durell Young, “Is the US’s PPBS Applicable to European Post-Communist 
Defense Institutions?,” RUSI Journal 161, no. 5 (October-November 2016): 68–77, doi:10.1080
/03071847.2016.1253382.
23      Branimir Furlan, “Civilian Control and Military Effectiveness: Slovenian Case,” Armed Forces 
and Society 39, no. 3 (2012): 442, doi:10.1177/0095327X12459167.
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unqualifi ed individuals to become commanders or take staff postings 
thereby undermining the basic concept of military professionalism.24
This pervasive practice of negative civilian control undermines 
the professional growth of the offi cer corps by denying demanding 
command and staff postings. Equally, these practices preclude offi cers 
from acquiring a full appreciation of all aspects of the operation of 
the armed forces, particularly their fi nancial implications and realities. 
In short, management of the armed forces is really a misnomer while 
administrating is clearly observable in the absence of experienced, 
professional military advice. The persistence of the Communist trinity 
of legacy concepts is nothing short of scandalous.
Despite the claim that such legacy practices constitute “national 
business” exempt from allied discussions, these practices produce senior 
leaders who have not been exposed to the same professionally challeng-
ing assignments as their Western counterparts: this fact ultimately creates 
problems in allied commands and multinational forces. Succinctly, the 
alliance should be interested in developing senior commanders who are 
capable of controlling the fi nancial and human resources necessary for 
combined operations.
To be sure, there are always exceptions to the rule, but one 
cannot ignore the possibility that limiting these offi cers from the 
same professional challenges enjoyed by their Western counterparts 
produces an offi cer corps with stunted professionalism. Equally, in lieu 
of healthy civil-military relations, one fi nds an unbalanced relationship 
substituting uninformed and risk-adverse administration for military 
professionalism.
Implications and Solutions
Arguably, Western and legacy command concepts are antithetical; 
however, the Communist trinity of legacy concepts—collective 
decision-making; confl ating leadership, command, and management; 
and hypercentralized decision-making—undermines the very basis of 
the Western defi nition of command. Absent a change in alliance policy 
and the selection of allied commanders, only time will tell how the stark 
conceptual rift between Western and residual legacy practices will affect 
the ability of commanders from these armed forces to operate within 
the alliance’s integrated military command structure. How have 25 
years of cooperation with NATO and its nations’ armed forces missed 
addressing this important challenge? Answers to this question are more 
easily found in both Western and Eastern policy failures.
The Western approach of providing assistance to new partners 
and allies has stressed technical solutions, often using Western models 
that have failed to address the two antithetical concepts of command. 
Moreover, Western nations’ training and professional military educa-
tional courses, which expose students to modern warfare, leadership, 
and management approaches, have only been partially successful. 
Appreciation (and one wonders, recognition) that this knowledge is 
highly contextualized and cannot easily be exported to different national 
and organizational environments has been lacking. As David Ralston 
24      Ibid., 441–42.
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writes in the context of exporting European army models in the nine-
teenth century, “The reformers were to learn, often to their dismay, that 
the introduction of European forms and methods into their military 
establishments would sooner or later oblige their societies to undergo 
internal adjustments which were by no means trivial.”25
Simply put, the conceptual difference between Western and Eastern 
defense and military concepts are so antithetical the adoption of the 
former is all but impossible without retiring the entire conceptual basis 
of legacy defense institutions. Even when legacy armed forces adopt 
some key Western-infl uenced reforms, junior and noncommissioned 
offi cers voice complaints that NATO procedures are faithfully followed 
during operations but legacy concepts prevail at home. Many young 
offi cers and NCOs, including many with operations experience, chafe 
at this reality.
The existence of this major differentiation in the concept of 
command clearly needs wider understanding and attention by all NATO 
nations. The traditional solution of “reform” needs to be rethought. Like 
it or not, past assistance policies and programs have neither identifi ed 
this conceptual command divide nor produced any effective methods 
to address it. This challenge to the Western alliance simply cannot be 
addressed at the technical level alone. To be sure, Western training and 
professional military education courses have their place. What needs to 
be acknowledged by senior offi cials in both Western and Eastern capitals 
is the conceptual divide in command, as well as other areas, is due to 
subtle factors that can only be addressed with a deep understanding of 
organizational sociological, conceptual, and political characteristics.
To be blunt, only Eastern allies at the level of presidents and prime 
ministers—offi cials who need to accept the urgency of effecting changes 
in how commanders are groomed, are selected for stressful and growing 
assignments, and are expected to command—can successfully address 
the contrast. After all, in any military organization, command is the 
“coin of the realm” and changing its basic characteristic will strike at the 
very institutional soul and enabling culture of an armed force. Such an 
initiative will not be easily accepted, particularly in the more profound 
legacy-leaning defense institutions where Western and legacy concepts 
of professionalism are antithetical and therefore incapable of coexisting 
(see table 2).26 Thus, senior Western political and military offi cials need 
to be prepared to exert sharp and consistent political pressure on their 
counterparts for the comprehensive exculpation of legacy concepts and 
assumptions as well as their replacement with modern Western con-
cepts. Assuredly, these will be politically painful, fundamental changes.
25      David B. Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of  European Military Techniques 
and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914 (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1900), 
173.
26      Michael H. Clemmesen, “Integration of  New Alliance Members: The Intellectual-Cultural 
Dimension,” Defense Analysis 15, no. 3 (December 1999): 261–72, doi:10.1080/713604685; and 
Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Case of  the Czech and Russian Armed 
Forces (Ann Arbor: University of  Michigan Press, 2000), 108–53.
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Table 2. The Professional Conceptual Divide27
Western concepts Eastern concepts
Practical





















Lying is not a sin
Failure is never an option, but 
a shame and disgrace
Conclusion
In summary, command as defi ned and practiced in many Central and 
Eastern European defense institutions, and expressed as a Communist 
trinity of legacy concepts, could not be more foreign and antithetical 
to Western approaches. This premise should come as no surprise 
since communism’s absolute centralization of power never entrusted 
lower offi cials with decision-making authority. Bereft of responsibility 
and accountability, the legacy defi nition of command constitutes 
absolute power over individuals, which likely explains why most newly 
independent republics systematically compromise commanders’ abilities 
to command. Largely absent in the region is a timely evolution of laws, 
policies, incentives, and control mechanisms that ensure the responsible 
exercise of command.
Yet, these concepts and practices are too limited by the continued 
practices of collective decision-making; confl ating leadership, command, 
and management; and hypercentralized decision-making to be effectively 
adopted, particularly regarding fi nancial authorities and human resource 
management. Overcoming these legacy concepts and comprehensively 
replacing them with their Western counterparts presents no small 
challenge. An encouraging fi rst step would be NATO nations’ universal 
and honest acknowledgement of the challenge and their commitment 
to addressing these atavistic legacies with deliberate and systematic new 
methods to effect change.
The only way to undertake this challenge is to place the solution 
where it belongs, at the highest political level. Thus, the default of long-
standing policies and programs that address defense reform as a military 
problem addressed via technical assistance programs alone needs to be 
fundamentally reviewed to develop new approaches based on a deep 
understanding of individual cultures and organizational sociologies. 
The solution to reforming legacy command concepts will be found in 
growing and empowering commanders.
27      Adapted from Young, “Impediments to Reform.”
